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Exploring rationality in schizophrenia
Rasmus Revsbech, Erik Lykke Mortensen, Gareth Owen, Julie Nordgaard, Lennart Jansson, Ditte Sæbye,
Trine Flensborg-Madsen and Josef Parnas
Background
Empirical studies of rationality (syllogisms) in patients with
schizophrenia have obtained different results. One study found
that patients reason more logically if the syllogism is presented
through an unusual content.
Aims
To explore syllogism-based rationality in schizophrenia.
Method
Thirty-eight first-admitted patients with schizophrenia and 38
healthy controls solved 29 syllogisms that varied in
presentation content (ordinary v. unusual) and validity (valid v.
invalid). Statistical tests were made of unadjusted and adjusted
group differences in models adjusting for intelligence and
neuropsychological test performance.
Results
Controls outperformed patients on all syllogism types, but the
difference between the two groups was only significant for
valid syllogisms presented with unusual content. However, when
adjusting for intelligence and neuropsychological test performance,
all group differences became non-significant.
Conclusions
When taking intelligence and neuropsychological performance
into account, patients with schizophrenia and controls perform
similarly on syllogism tests of rationality.
Declaration of interest
None.
Copyright and usage
© The Royal College of Psychiatrists 2015. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Non-Commercial, No Derivatives (CC BY-NC-ND)
licence.
Patients with schizophrenia are often seen as irrational because
their beliefs or actions are irrational at first glance. Cognitive
science distinguishes between two kinds of rationality: instru-
mental and epistemic. Instrumental rationality concerns the extent
to which decisions and actions approximate the best ways to
achieve appropriate goals. Epistemic rationality concerns the
extent to which beliefs and thought processes are formed in
coherence with logical rules – and correspond to the structure of
the world as it is intersubjectively assumed1. Thus, rationality is a
normative concept, which means that it corresponds to a certain
ideal of adequacy and efficiency. It is not clear how the flagrant
irrationality of psychosis relates to possible irrationality as
described by cognitive science.
Dual process theory of rationality
The most widely acknowledged neuroscientific view on rationality is
the so-called ‘dual process theory’. This theory proposes two parallel
processes that are active in both epistemic and instrumental
rationality: analytic v. heuristic or explicit-tacit v. reflective-automatic,
etc.1 Sometimes, it is appropriate to be analytic and reflect system-
atically to reach a strategy or an understanding; on other occasions, it
is more appropriate to use heuristic strategies to make fast choices
and take immediate action. Which style dominates depends on the
situational demands.2 For instance, when writing a manuscript most
people apply analytic processes to evaluate every word and sentence
to make the text logical and easy to understand. However, it would
not make sense to engage in deep reflection when deciding to take
a left turn in a complex traffic situation. Normally, automatised
behavioural patterns, sedimented from experience are mobilised to
make a heuristically determined move. However, in many situations
both analytic and heuristic processes are activated; it is more a matter
of relative dominance in any given situation.1,2
Rationality and irrationality
In cognitive tests, rationality is assessed and defined by the level of
efficiency in solving test items. As efficiency is a matter of degree,
being less rational does not imply irrationality. Irrationality – at
least in a common understanding – is moving beyond a critical
point of inefficiency on a continuum. An irrational person
displays behaviour, thoughts and beliefs that do not benefit the
person’s goals (lack of instrumental rationality), nor do they fit
the structure of the world as it is commonly accepted to be (lack
of epistemic rationality).1
Testing irrationality in schizophrenia
Cognitive science has studied rationality and irrationality
by employing various tests of reasoning. Among those are
syllogisms.3–7
A syllogism is a certain argument structure, where the validity
of the conclusion depends on the validity of the preceding
premises (i.e. the truth of the conclusion depends on the truth
of the premises).8 To illustrate, the following content concerning
water, ice and temperature has been structured as both a valid and
an invalid syllogism. Valid: All ice (P) is water (Q). All ice (P) is
frozen (R); therefore some water (Q) is frozen (R). Invalid: All ice
(P) is water (Q). Some water (Q) is frozen (R); therefore, ice (P) is
frozen (R). Although it may be difficult to understand at first
glance, the syllogism reflects a certain logical structure or a
blueprint, which can be applied to any verbal content. Formally, it
is like an equation applicable to sentences, but it is likely that the
error rate is affected by the semantic embodiment (content) of
the sentences. Such embodiment may be ordinary or unusual.
Ordinary content refers to the instance where the content of the
syllogism is congruent with what would be typically familiar to us
from experience. Thus, some syllogisms may be based on
completely ordinary content such as ‘the sun rises in the east’,
or as in the syllogism concerning water above,7 whereas other
syllogisms have unusual presentations such as ‘blue concepts’ or
‘buildings that sing’.
Validity judgements about syllogisms have been documented
to be influenced by the nature of their content (ordinary v.
unusual).4,9,10 Thus if the participant finds the presented content
as being unusual, a ‘false’-response will be more easily activated.
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Conversely, if the participant finds the presentation content
ordinary, it will more likely stimulate a ‘true’-response.5,10
In general, research based on syllogisms has suggested that
patients with schizophrenia show impaired performance in
syllogism tests of rationality.3,11,12 However, performance on
syllogism tests of rationality is to some extent associated with
intelligence5 and consequently, rationality deficits in schizophre-
nia may simply reflect the lower average IQ which is observed in
patients with schizophrenia.13 Goel et al3 found that patients
performed equally poorly across all content types and controls
performed better in general. However, only controls showed better
performance as a result of ordinary presentation. Williams6 and
Mirian et al5 found no differences between diagnostic groups
when controlling for IQ. They suggested that the underperfor-
mance of patients could be attributed to a general cognitive
dysfunction that characterises schizophrenia. Mirian et al5 also
found that both patients and controls performed better on certain
syllogisms, i.e. valid syllogism with ordinary content and invalid
syllogisms with unusual content. However, the sample size in this
study was small and IQ was the only covariate.
Contradicting all expectations, Owen et al7 found that when
the study groups were matched for IQ, patients with schizo-
phrenia outperformed healthy controls on valid syllogisms with
unusual presentation content or invalid syllogisms with ordinary
presentation content. These results were interpreted as being
consistent with phenomenological observations on cognition in
schizophrenia: many patients with schizophrenia have an intact
ability to analytic-reflective reasoning and are often even hyper-
reflective, but are in general impaired in a pre-reflective, context-
sensitive understanding of the world.7,14 These phenomena
manifest in tendencies towards being hyper-logical and hyper-
reflective and in lacking the mastery of more contextually adapted,
fluid aspects of life, governed more by ‘the logic of the world
rather than the logic of the logicians’.14 Therefore, the results of
Owen et al7 carried a substantial significance and novelty.
However, their study did not include syllogisms that were invalid
with unusual presentation content nor valid with ordinary
presentation content and the study was also limited by a small
sample size, only group level IQ matching, and the lack of
comprehensive neuropsychological data.
The aim of the present study was to investigate performance
of patients with schizophrenia on syllogism tests of rationality,
including analyses controlling for intelligence and neuropsycho-
logical test performance. An additional aim was to replicate the
theoretically very important results of Owen et al by investigating
whether patients with schizophrenias reason relatively more
logically when syllogisms are presented through unusual and
strange content.
Method
The study was carried out at Psychiatric Center Hvidovre, a
department of the University of Copenhagen providing psychiatric
service to a population of 150 000 in a catchment area of the city
of Copenhagen. Data collection took place over 18 months
starting from September 2011. To be included, all participants
had to give informed consent and be considered capable of
lengthy testing.
Participants
We recruited 38 patients diagnosed with the DSM-IV schizo-
phrenia from a sample of 100 first-admitted, diagnostically
heterogeneous, consecutive patients who had participated in a
larger diagnostic project, which involved very lengthy psychiatric
interviews.15,16 Severely psychotic, aggressive, forcibly admitted or
legal patients, and patients with primary or clinically significant
alcohol/drug abuse were excluded (all these categories constitute a
substantial proportion of first, acute admissions), resulting in a
patient sample comprising 20 women and 18 men. The details of
diagnostic assessment are published elsewhere.15 Briefly, all
patients were interviewed with the Structured Clinical Interview
for DSM-IV (SCID)-I and the schizotypal personality disorder
module from the SCID-II, the Operational Criteria Checklist scale
expanded with the additional items from the Schedule for
Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia-Lifetime and Bonner Skala
Für die Beurteilung von Basissymptomen and a checklist of the
First Rank Symptom continua, and a Mental Status Examination,
listing a variety of abnormal expressive features.17,19 The DSM-IV
schizophrenia diagnosis was allocated according to best lifetime
consensus estimate between two senior clinicians (J.N. and J.P.).
The 38 healthy control participants were recruited as volun-
teers from the greater Copenhagen area, mainly among staff and
medical students at the Psychiatric Center Hvidovre. It was
required that the controls had no psychiatric history, no abuse,
no current mental problems, and had not suffered from organic
brain damage or a neurological disease. The healthy control
participants were screened (by R.R.) for eligibility with a brief,
semi-structured interview addressing social and psychiatric his-
tory, evidence of abuse and current possible psychiatric com-
plaints and a mental state evaluation. Six potential volunteers for
the control group had to be excluded due to self-reported
problems that met the exclusion criteria.
The final study sample comprised 38 healthy control par‐
ticipants and 38 patients meeting the DSM-IV criteria for
schizophrenia.
Descriptive information of the demographic data is presented
in Table 1.
Assessments
Psychometric testing of healthy controls as well as patients
was undertaken by an MA in psychology with experience in
neuropsychology (R.R.).
Rationality was measured using syllogisms. The syllogisms
comprised two premises and a conclusion varying in two
dimensions: ordinary v. unusual presentation content and valid
v. invalid syllogisms. The syllogisms were presented on paper,
where the participant was instructed to respond by marking each
syllogism as either ‘True’ or ‘False’. Participants were given
standardised verbal and written instructions that had been
formulated in collaboration with Owen et al7 to make the
instructions as similar as possible to those used in the original
study by Owen et al.
The task included 29 syllogisms divided into four subgroups:
. 7 Valid syllogisms with Ordinary Presentations (VOP)
(e.g. if one steals, one is not liked; all thieves steal;
therefore, all thieves are not liked).
. 7 Invalid syllogisms with Ordinary Presentations (IOP)
(e.g. if the sun rises, the sun is in the east; the sun is in
the east; therefore, the sun rises).
. 8 Valid syllogisms with Unusual Presentations (VUP)
(e.g. all buildings speak loudly; a hospital does not speak
loudly; therefore, a hospital is not a building).
. 7 Invalid syllogisms with Unusual Presentations (IUP)
(e.g. the sun emits radio waves; radio waves emit Madonna;
therefore, the sun emits Madonna). The IUP are strictly
logically speaking, not proper syllogisms. However, we
added this group to achieve a certain symmetrical balance
in the test material.
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The syllogisms were numbered and randomised using a
number generator in SPSS. The randomised order was then used
as the standard order of the syllogisms throughout the entire study
to avoid noise related to different item orders. The IOP and VUP
syllogisms were kindly provided by the research group of Owen
et al.7 The two additional subgroups of syllogisms (VOP and IUP)
were designed according to guidelines from Forbes.8
In this manner, complementing Owen et al’s7 IOP and VUP
with the additional VOP and IUP syllogisms, resulted in the entire
matrix of constellations between unusual and ordinary presenta-
tions and valid and invalid syllogisms.
Intelligence (IQ) was derived from a sum score of four
IST-2000-R computerised subtests.20 The IQ battery comprised
Sentence Completion, Verbal Analogies, Number Series and
Matrices. The selected IQ subtests represent both verbal and non-
verbal IQ domains.20 The possible maximum was 80 because
each of the four subtests had a maximum score of 20. Means
and standard errors of intelligence and each neuropsychological
measure are presented in Table 2.
Neuropsychological performance was measured with four
PC-implemented subtests from Cambridge Neuropsychological
Test Automated Battery (CANTAB). This CANTAB-derived
Table 1 Demographic characteristics of sample
Patients Controls
Variable n % n % P
Gender 0.003a
Male 18 47.4 6 15.8
Female 20 52.6 32 84.2
Total 38 100 38 100
Partner status 0.011a
In a relationship 26 31.6 23 60.5
Alone 12 68.4 15 39.5
Education 0.000c
≤10 years 9 10.5 0 0
≥12–13 years 22 57.9 5 13.2
≥14–16 years 3 7.9 6 15.8
Bachelor’s degree 5 13.2 21 55.3
≥ Master’s degree 4 10.5 6 15.8
Employment status 0.000b
Working and supporting oneself +6 months 11 28.9 37 97.4
Working and supporting oneself <6 months 6 15.8 0 0
Not working and not supporting oneself 21 55.3 1 2.6
Lifetime admissions to hospital
0 0 0 0 0
1–2 25 65.8 0 0
3+ 13 34.2 0 0
Substance abuse 0.040b
No 34 89.5 36 94.7
Suspected 4 10.5 2 5.3
Yes 0 0 0 0
a. Chi-squared test.
b. One-way ANOVA.
c. Mann–Whitney U-test.
Table 2 Mean scores, standard deviations (s.d.) and group difference significances for intelligence and neuropsychological measures
and their composite scorea
Patients Controls
Measures Domain Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Pb
Intelligence raw score (maximum 80) Fluid, crystallised, verbal and non-verbal
intelligence
36.74 12.98 45.79 10.68 0.001
Neuropsychological composite score Global neuropsychological performance 0.33 1.09 −0.33 0.79 0.004
5-Choice Reaction Time (RTIa) Sustained attention in movement
(milliseconds)
487.89 127.85 437.22 124.04 0.086
5-Choice Reaction Time (RTIb) Sustained attention in reaction (milliseconds) 311.67 44.15 303.07 44.16 0.402
Spatial Working Memory (SWMa) Working memory strategy rate 31.24 12.18 27.66 7.35 0.125
Spatial Working Memory (SWMb) Working memory error rate 18.92 16.32 11.89 11.88 0.005
Intra-Extra Dimensional set shift (IEDa) Attention shift efficiency rate 75.08 13.96 66.68 15.12 0.014
Intra-Extra Dimensional set shift (IEDb) Attention shift error rate 13.82 6.32 10.32 5.04 0.009
One-Touch Stockings (OTSa) Executive functioning rate of correct first-
choice solutions to a problem
18.42 3.78 19.39 2.55 0.192
One-Touch Stockings (OTSb) Executive functioning rate of correcting a
wrong first choice
1.33 0.28 1.23 0.19 0.039
a. Sustained attention (RTI) is measured by milliseconds of movement and latency in reaction to stimulus and response. Working memory (SWM) is measured by the efficiency rate of
memory strategy and amount of memory errors. Attention’s adaptive ability (IED) is measured by amount of trials and errors in attention shifting. Executive functioning (OTS) is
measured by a rate of the ability to correctly plan and visualise a solution to a problem on first choice, and by the rate of choices it takes to eventually solve it correctly if not correct
at first. Except for intelligence and OTSs, lower scores equal better performances on all measures.
b. ANOVA.
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battery consisted of the Reaction Time (RTI) test,21,22 the Spatial
Working Memory (SWM) test,23,24 the Intra-Extra Dimensional
Set Shift (IED) test25 and the One-Touch Stockings (OTS)
test.26,27 The selected tests represent a continuum from simple to
more complex cognitive functioning, which put demands on
frontal lobe-dependent functioning. A composite score was
extracted from the neuropsychological battery by principle
components analysis.
Data analysis
Statistical analyses were conducted in SPSS version 20. We
compared the groups on IQ and the neuropsychological battery
using ANOVA. Owing to non-normal distributions the scores of
two groups on the four types of syllogism were compared using
both the t-test and the non-parametric rank-sum test. Further-
more, the scores of the two groups were compared by analysis
of covariance (ANCOVA) adjusting for intelligence and the
composite score of neuropsychological measures. The assumption
of parallel regression in the two groups between covariates and
syllogism outcomes was tested in preliminary analyses and revealed
only minor violations, and ANCOVA with robust variance estima-
tion showed essentially the same results.
Ethical issues
The Institutional Review Board of the University of Copenhagen,
the Mental Health Services – Capital Region of Denmark, the
Danish Data Protection Agency and the National Committee on
Health Research Ethics approved the study.
Results
Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics of the two study
groups. There were significant differences between the two groups
with respect to gender (P=0.003), educational level (P<0.001),
employment and income status (P<0.001). These differences
reflect the fact that the control group mainly consisted of well-
educated persons, whereas patients with schizophrenia had little
education and were often unemployed.28
Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations and main
effects of groups for intelligence and the neuropsychological
measures. There were significant group differences in intelligence
(P=0.001), the ability to correct memory mistakes in SWM
(P=0.005) and OTS (prefrontal functioning flexibility) (P=0.039),
and IED (attention flexibility) (P=0.009).
In models adjusting for intelligence, the composite neuropsy-
chological score, and group (patient v. controls), gender was not
significantly associated with performance on any of the four types
of syllogism and therefore not adjusted for in the subsequent
comparisons.
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations of the
percentage correct answers for the four types of syllogisms. Several
of these distributions showed considerable negative skewness,
probably reflecting ceiling effects. Both patients and controls
obtained the lowest percentage of correct answers on invalid
syllogism presented with ordinary content and the highest
percentage of correct answers on invalid syllogisms presented
with unusual content. The controls outperformed the patients on
both types of syllogism, but the mean group differences were small
and non-significant by a t-test.
For the valid syllogisms both groups obtained the highest
percentage correct when the syllogisms were presented with
ordinary content. The controls outperformed the patients, but
the difference between the two groups was small and non-
significant. The largest group difference was obtained for valid
syllogisms presented with unusual content. For these syllogisms,
both a t-test and a rank-sum test showed a significant group
difference (P<0.01).
For the combined sample, the correlations between the IQ
score and the four types of syllogism were 0.38, 0.03, 0.42 and 0.44
for the VUP-, VOP-, IUP- and IOP syllogisms (the corresponding
correlation for the composite neuropsychological measure were
0.45, 0.07, 0.21 and 0.24). Thus, correlations were significant
except for the valid ordinary syllogism, and the non-significant
correlations for this syllogism type may reflect a ceiling effect.
Table 3 shows that when ANCOVA was conducted with
intelligence and the composite neuropsychological score as
covariates, all group differences on the four types of syllogism
became non-significant.
Finally, within the patient group no correlation was significant
between the neurocognitive measures, IQ, and syllogism test
performance on the one hand and the summary scores of positive
and negative symptom scores.16
Discussion
In this cross-sectional, case–control study investigating perfor-
mance of patients with schizophrenia on four types of syllogism,
we found that the patients performed non-significantly lower than
healthy controls on three types of syllogism, whereas the group
difference was significant on valid syllogism presented with
unusual content. However, this group difference also became
non-significant when adjusted for intelligence and a composite
score on a neuropsychological battery.
The patient and control groups differed by about 0.7 s.d. on
both the measure of intelligence and the composite neuropsycho-
logical score. It is therefore remarkable that intelligence and the
neuropsychological score explained most variance (24%) on valid
syllogisms with unusual content, which was the type of syllogism
for which the largest group difference was observed. The fact that
the group difference became non-significant when intelligence
and the neuropsychological score were controlled in ANCOVA
suggests the observed group differences are a consequence of
global cognitive levels of performance in the two groups. For
the combined sample both intelligence and the composite
Table 3 Unadjusted and adjusted mean group differences for percentage rates of correct responses on the four syllogism types (i.e. VOP,
IOP, VUP and IUP)
Patients Controls
Syllogism type Mean s.d. Adjusted mean Mean s.d. Adjusted mean t-test ANCOVA
Ordinary content
Valid 86.5 16.0 86.1 91.4 12.4 91.5 0.14 0.14
Invalid 29.4 26.1 34.0 36.0 21.4 32.3 0.23 0.76
Unusual content
Valid 54.3 39.3 59.6 79.6 30.8 73.8 0.003 0.09
Invalid 87.6 16.3 90.9 93.2 17.2 90.9 0.15 0.83
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neuropsychological score correlated significantly with syllogism
scores except for the valid ordinary syllogism, and the non-
significant correlations for this syllogism type may reflect a ceiling
effect. Thus, the correlations also suggest that the demands of
syllogism tests of rationality are closely related to verbal intelli-
gence, widely documented to be impaired in patients with
schizophrenia.13,29,30 In contrast, the irrationality that is clinically
characteristic of psychosis and schizophrenia in particular appears
in this study to be unrelated to the cognitive processes assessed by
syllogism tests of rationality.
Mirian et al5 found similar results and suggested that reason-
ing measured by syllogisms in patients with schizophrenia simply
mirror the broad range of cognitive dysfunctions and lower IQ.
This interpretation is likely in the light of schizophrenia’s well
documented broad range of cognitive dysfunction31,32 as well as
the nature of Mirian et al’s findings.5 Thus, tests of syllogistic
reasoning do not appear to be a sensitive method for assessing
irrationality relevant to psychosis.
In sum, we were not able to replicate the findings of Owen
et al.7 Since our study included the same test items, possible
explanations for the discrepant results should be considered.
Relevant methodological factors may be adjusting for IQ by
matching v. ANCOVA and adjusting for IQ v. for both IQ and
neuropsychological measures. However, a more likely explanation
is that the discrepant results reflect the differences between the
included patient and control study samples. The groups in Owen
et al’s study were only about half our sample size and rather
homogeneous (with a smaller variance in IQ in both cases and
controls), whereas the groups in the present study had a larger
variance in IQ among both cases and controls. A limitation of our
study was the relatively small sample size and the relatively large
differences between patients and controls with regard to IQ and
neuropsychological performance. Adjusting for IQ and the
composite neuropsychological score in ANCOVA should theore-
tically account for these group differences, but the distributions of
the outcome on syllogisms were skewed and the ANCOVA may
not fully adjust for the relatively large group differences.
Furthermore, the possibility of ceiling effects could indicate that
the valid ordinary syllogisms and invalid unusual syllogisms were
too easy to solve.
Finally, there is one notable methodological difference
between the two studies with respect to administration of the
syllogisms. In the study by Owen et al, a researcher administered
the syllogisms and the participants read the syllogisms out aloud.
To eliminate the risk of a possible Rosenthal effect (i.e. the
administrator involuntarily and subliminally signalling right or
wrong answers) we made sure that the patient had understood the
principles and left all participants to solve the syllogisms on
their own.
The results of this study shed light on certain forms of
rationality and irrationality in schizophrenia by corroborating one
previous study5 and contradicting another.7 The adjusted results
suggest that rational thinking is more normal in patients with
schizophrenia than usually assumed, and that patients with
schizophrenia, despite psychosis, do not perform qualitatively
different from controls in syllogism tests of rationality. However,
the unadjusted results suggest deficits in rationality, and the
substantial effects of adjusting for IQ and neuropsychological
performance indicate that the observed rationality deficits in
schizophrenia to some extent reflect deficits in cognitive and
neuropsychological functions. It remains an open question whether
schizophrenia is associated with rationality deficits that are specific
to the disease, and the common assumption that healthy people and
people with schizophrenia can be differentiated by the presence or
non-presence of test-measurable rationality is questionable and
needs further exploration. Moreover, it leaves important questions
as to whether the metacognitive ‘top-down’ deficits in psychotic-
patients33,34 are, in fact, responsible for delusion formation. As
mentioned above, we found no correlation between psychometric
measures of the severity of the psychosis and syllogism tests, IQ or
neurocognition.
In conclusion, rationality and irrationality in schizophrenia
may not be sufficiently illuminated by the use of syllogisms. To
explore rationality more closely, we need a variety of clearly
defined, ecologically valid tests, as well as tests of neurocognition
that has unequivocal relevance for real, daily life functioning
(including social cognition). Future research in rationality and
schizophrenia could probably benefit from the research in neuro-
economical decision bias (see, for instance, Stanovich & West35)
to search for similarities and discrepancies between healthy and
pathological rationality. We also need to explore the relations
between specific dimensions of psychopathology, such as delu-
sionality, formal thought disorder and subjective anomalies in self-
awareness and world- and social relations.
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